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ABSTRACT
The EU plays a significant role in public policy aspects of Internet
governance, having created in the late s the dot eu Internet Top
Level Domain (TLD). This enables users to register names under a
European online address label. This paper explores key public policy
issues in the emergent governance system for dot eu, because it provides
an interesting case of new European transnational private governance.
Specifically, dot eu governance is a reconciliation resulting from a
governance cultural clash between the European regulatory state and
what can be described broadly as the Internet community. The EU has
customised the governance of dot eu towards a public–private dispersed
agencification model. The paper extends the evidence base on agencifi-
cation within trans-European regulatory networks and the emergence
of private transnational network governance characterised by
self-regulation.
The task of creating a global governance system for the Internet has
exercised the minds of governmental, commercial and civil society
interests since the mid s (see Mueller ). The Internet is
significant, and possibly unique, in having been considered from the
outset of its relatively short commercial life to be most usefully
developed and exploited as a global medium. In particular, the
Internet’s potential as a global economic resource, as well as a global
electronic marketplace, placed a high value on securing a stake in new
structures and processes for its governance, as well as the values and
norms underpinning them (see Christou and Simpson ). Many of
the features of the current phase of economic globalisation (Dicken
) are recognisable in the policy discourses and practices of
governance of the Internet economy.
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The emergence of transnational private Internet governance is
strongly evident in the system designed for naming and addressing on the
Internet, which has been at times controversial and hotly contested given
its strategic economic importance. The paper focuses on the emerging
international political economy of the governance of this Domain Name
System (DNS) and the particular policy activity of the European Union
(EU). Given the historical origins of the Internet in the technical and
academic communities of the United States, the EU was not a forerunner
in earliest moves to create a governance system for the Internet as it
became increasingly commercialised. Nonetheless, the political-economic
and social significance of the Internet having been realised, as the s
progressed the EU developed a series of policy positions on the future
course of development which the Internet should take and a set of
strategic actions stemming from these. For the EU, Internet policy has
become a vital if not yet the central plank of its policy for the Information
and Communications Technologies (ICT) sector, taking on in the process
important domestic (that is intra-EU) and international (that is inter-state
and global institutional) dimensions.
In the important policy area of the Internet DNS, the EU launched a
policy initiative, in the late s, seeking the creation of the dot eu
Internet Top Level Domain (TLD). Dot eu provides a means for Internet
users to register their names under a European label, thereby giving them
a European address and identity on the Internet.
This paper explores the key features and implications of the process of
policy design that have produced the still emerging governance system
for dot eu, which provides an interesting case of new European
transnational private governance. In particular, the system has drawn
upon and will comply with when fully implemented a number of core
practices for the governance of Internet domain names developed
globally, most outstandingly, private interest self-regulation and alterna-
tive dispute resolution (ADR). Nevertheless, the governance of dot eu has
also been customised in a European way – a form of European
domestication – by the EU. When fully operational, the dot eu govern-
ance system will involve a trans-European regulatory network whose
central, and arguably most important, node will be the European
Registry for Internet Domains (Eurid), a private, transnational, not-for-
profit, company responsible, inter alia, for the dot eu registry. The other
private actors in the network are ADR providers, registrar companies,
validation agents and, finally, registrants under dot eu. However, the
network will also contain a crucial and influential public dimension in the
shape of the European Commission, acting as the agent of its Member
States, responsible for ensuring the implementation of, and compliance
with, the series of recently agreed public policy rules (PPR) to govern dot eu.
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In theoretical terms, we account for the structure of the EU’s govern-
ance system for dot eu through application and extension of work on the
regulatory state (Moran , ) in an era of globalisation. Our
specific proposition is that the design of the dot eu system represents a
significant, though only partial, movement towards post-regulatory state
governance (Scott ). To explicate this position, we map the likely
operational mechanics of dot eu by employing a conceptual framework
which extends academic analysis in two areas. First, we consider work on
self-regulation (Baldwin and Cave ; Price and Verhulst, , ),
an important part of the policy debate on Internet governance for at least
the last decade. We argue that the dot eu governance system will function
as a specific kind of self-regulation, containing somewhat paradoxical
elements of mandatory delegation and public sector shadowing. Second,
the paper draws on work on trans-European network governance
(Majone ), which argues for the creation of public European
regulatory agencies (Majone ) to undertake tasks in sectors requiring
economic and social regulation in the face of perceived problems with the
credibility of EU regulation. We argue that dot eu will function as a
specific type of trans-European network governance in which hybrid
public–private dispersed agencification is evident.
Overall, the creation of this novel type of governance system represents
a reconciliation resulting from a governance cultural clash between the
European regulatory state on the one hand and what can be described
broadly as the Internet community on the other. Specifically, the EU has
decided to create a system of regulatory governance for dot eu in which
it has adopted and is internalising, a negotiated reading of the discourse
and practices of self-regulation widely articulated in the Internet
community – composed mainly of technical and commercial interests
(see Mueller ) – and developed institutionally in well established
(notably the World Intellectual Property Organisation) and new (notably
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) global
forums (see Simpson ).
Agencies, trans-European networked governance and the European regulatory state
The development of a governance framework for the Internet has been
inextricably linked to wider regulatory changes because of the exigencies
of an increasingly globalised economy. Such changes have been charac-
terised at domestic level by a shift to negative coordination in the
regulatory state (see Jayasuriya ), based on economic governance
through regulation (see Scharpf , , ) with an emphasis on
the role of independent, though often publicly funded, agencies and
institutions in ensuring credibility and a commitment to market order.
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This decoupling of government from governance has, according to
Tshuma (: ), ‘ entail[ed] the delegation of tasks by policymakers to
other actors and institutions that are better able to implement global
public policies . . . includ[ing] public sector agencies . . . but also
business, labor and non-governmental organizations’.
Debates about the movement to a regulatory state have also taken
place in the context of Europeanisation, involving in part the creation of
new regulatory governance arrangements at the EU level (Green Cowles,
Caporaso and Risse ), which have had varying degrees of impact on
national Member States (Burch and Bulmer ). Strong claims have
been made that within Europe there has been a replacement of the
positive state with the regulatory state – a change from a directly
interventionist approach to one which addresses market failure through
rule-making using strategies of privatisation, liberalisation and re-
regulation at the national level, delivered through independent public
regulatory bodies and increased EU regulatory activity (Moran, ,
; Thatcher a: ; see also Seidman and Gilmore ;
McGowan and Wallace ; Majone , , ). Majone ()
has argued that the EU has played a vital role in the further development
of the regulatory state in Europe shaping its own characteristic approach
to core elements of the regulatory state in action, notably re-regulation
and liberalisation. Here, the European Commission has emerged as a
central agent of its Member States in this process.
In the communications sector, the recent transformation of telecom-
munications provides a clear example of the growth of the European
regulatory state (see Humphreys and Simpson ). This was deeply
influenced by fundamental structural changes in the global political
economy, which had important practical and ideological dimensions.
The economic imperatives of globalisation were underpinned and
infused by neo-liberal political ideology which advocated strongly the
pursuit of nationally and internationally open and liberalised markets as
the way to realise technical progress and broad economic and social
welfare enhancement. A battery of new legislation has been created at
EU level framing a more uniform (though by no means identical),
liberalised set of telecommunications markets across the EU (Thatcher
). Consequently, European telecommunications has been trans-
formed from a series of nationally compartmentalised, highly uncompeti-
tive sectors based on public ownership into a competitive series of
markets shaped and governed by a detailed regulatory framework,
containing national (in the shape of a series of independent, though
publicly funded, National Regulatory Authorities) and European level
elements. Aside from its legislative dimension, the European Commission
has played an important role in promoting the new multi-level approach
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to telecommunications governance (Sandholtz ), as well as ensuring
the implementation of the agreed framework. Throughout this process of
change, the Commission has acted as a principal agent for its Member
States (Thatcher ).
The emergence of the European regulatory state has called forth
academic work on the concepts of trans-European networked governance
and regulatory agencies in Europe (Majone , ). This work has
highlighted a concern over a lack of sufficient administrative resources
and the increasing politicisation of the European Commission. A
proposed solution is the creation of independent European regulatory
agencies ‘ embedded in transnational networks of national regulators and
international organizations’ (Majone : ) to create subsidiarity,
accountability and efficiency. The delegation of responsibilities raises
issues of policy design and public accountability of the designated
agencies, which are unlikely to act with complete autonomy either
horizontally (in terms of being required to act in concert with others) or
vertically (in terms of being subject to administrative review). An
efficacious transnational regulatory network is deemed to require mutual
trust and cooperation, a common regulatory philosophy and high levels
of professionalisation in its regulators.
Whilst work on trans-European networked governance and agencies
emphasises their public nature, we argue that this model can be
instructive for explaining the public–private dispersed agencification of
Internet governance which the EU has set up for dot eu. The agencifi-
cation of dot eu has placed a key role in the hands of Eurid, which is
private and thus legally separate from the EU. Its organisational
relationships with other actors, most particularly the European Commis-
sion, are clearly mapped out in the set of public policy rules for dot eu,
an example of European regulatory state activity. Our analysis modifies
the idea that an agency must be de facto in complete charge of a
programme. The agencification we witness involves a significant dispersal
of responsibility across a trans-European regulatory network, which has
also important global links. The dot eu case provides more evidence of
exactly how agencification within a trans-European regulatory network
can take shape. However, an equally important aspect of the dot eu
governance system, uncharacteristic of the European regulatory state, is
self-regulation.
Self-regulation, public policy and ideas of the post-regulatory state
In economic terms, the concept of self-regulation, in its purest form,
suggests that players in any market have the freedom, but also the
responsibility, to set rules for their own behaviour. A market governed by
The Internet and Public–Private Governance in the European Union 
self-regulation is thus, in theory, the most liberally ordered commercial
construct in the capitalist system. However, in practice, as Price and
Verhulst (: ) point out, self-regulation ‘ is almost a misnomer . . .
[which] . . . rarely exists without some relationship between industry and
the state’. Given the history and complexity of state-industry relations, it
follows that self-regulation is by no means practised uniformly across
sectors and states. The essential element in the variety of self-regulatory
forms is the extent to which the state is detached from or involved in the
regulatory process. This has generally been described as ‘ regulated
self-regulation’ in the academic literature (see Price and Verhulst ) or
in public policymaking circles as ‘ co-regulation’ (European Commission
a). However, the exact nature of self-regulation is an empirical
question in the first instance and leaves scope for a series of possibilities.
Price and Verhulst () have defined four possible types of self-
regulation. The mandated variety occurs where the state sets out in detail
a regulatory framework and industry players are required to define and
agree to patterns of behaviour underpinned by norms in line with this
framework. Less hands on is a second situation of coerced self-regulation,
where the state makes clear its intention to intervene unless industry
devises and enforces collectively a self-regulatory system satisfactory to
government. By contrast self-regulation can thirdly occur where industry
players take the initiative in formulating a self-regulatory package which
is then subjected to state scrutiny. Finally, and rarely observed, self-
regulation can occur in a purely voluntary way with no direct state
stimulus or intervention.
The conceptualisation and practices of self-regulation have recently
been linked to work on the post-regulatory state in Europe, though
self-regulation existed well before the emergence of ideas of the regulat-
ory state. It has been suggested that the EU has sought recently to
consider new structural and procedural forms of governance (Ronit :
) in which delegation to regulatees and the use of soft law mechanisms,
such as codes of conduct, have become more important. This movement
away from traditional hierarchical, command and control governance
approaches has led to the proposition that a post- regulatory state may be
in the process of developing nationally and internationally (Scott :
–). Alternative, de-centralized forms of governance are considered,
notably responsive regulation, in which persuasion rather than tradi-
tional forms of regulatory coercion is the dominant regulatory mechan-
ism. However, responsive regulation has a coercive backdrop of ‘ default’
government intervention. In this respect, the post-regulatory state is only
a modification, albeit a significant one, rather than qualitative transfor-
mation, of the regulatory state, given the state-shadowed nature of the
self-regulation characterising it.
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The core ideas of the post-regulatory state have resonated in debates
on the governance of the Internet and feature in the design of the dot eu
governance system. The Internet developed originally outside European
national and supranational governance tradition and practices. Indeed,
to many, in particular those pioneers from the computer science and
academic communities who used it before its popularisation and com-
mercialisation, the idea of having any form of governance for the Internet
was alien. There was particular concern from libertarian quarters about
the need to maintain the Internet free from interference by the state,
many conflating the notions of governance with restriction and censor-
ship. Nonetheless, its rapid rise as a communications tool of potential
global reach, as well as a virtual marketplace, meant that the desire to
gain a stake in the emerging Internet economy placed governance issues
centre stage in global policy deliberations on its future, in which the
world’s most powerful political and economic actors have played the key
roles (Dresner ).
Throughout these deliberations, self-regulation has figured promi-
nently, for at least three reasons. First, Internet regulation is highly
complex, covering a whole raft of often overlapping commercial,
political, social and technical issues related to its infrastructure and the
content posted and exchanged across it. In situations of such complexity,
for government officials with a political remit it is often alluring and
convenient to extol the virtues of self-management. Second, the Internet,
though initially funded by the American government, developed largely
in the private and non-commercial (the computer science and academic
community) context. Given the more sceptical American view of the
utility of government intervention than is found in Europe, there was thus
a strong reluctance to develop top down command and control regulat-
ory structures. This was particularly evident in discussions on the
governance of the DNS. Third, the global and highly decentralized
nature of the Internet’s architecture militated against the easy creation of
state led governance systems at either the national or global levels. If, as
Lessig () famously argued, ‘ code is law’, then the functional nature
of the Internet seemed to possess an inherent logic of some kind of
self-regulation.
What this meant for the EU’s approach to the governance of the dot
eu TLD is a strategy with an uneasy juxtaposition of the liberal
imperatives of the Internet with the more paternalistic patterns of EU
regulatory state governance exemplified in telecommunications (see
Table ). The result is a partial post-regulatory state system of self-
regulation in the shadow of public hierarchy. Thus, for example, the EU
has argued that ‘ Internet management has generally been based on the
principles of non-interference, self-management and self-regulation. To
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the extent that this is possible and without prejudice to Community law,
these principles should also apply to the dot eu ccTLD’ (European
Parliament and Council : ). However, it also declared that ‘ the
Commission shall adopt public policy rules concerning the implementa-
tion and functions of the dot eu TLD and the public policy rules on
registration’ (European Parliament and Council : ).
The emergence of the dot eu top level domain
The emergence of the dot eu TLD must be seen in the context of the
increasing commercialisation of the Internet and its importance as an
economic resource (Waesche ). As Internet activity expanded, so too
did the political economic and strategic significance of the management
of its technical and organisational resources, an important element of
which was the hierarchically ordered DNS, with TLDs, as they are
known, playing the most crucial role at the root of Internet addresses.
Domain names, which developed historically along the two lines of
generic (e.g. dot com) and country code names (e.g. dot de, dot uk)
respectively, allowed visibility for business and governments in an
emerging global marketplace. This in turn had a significant effect on the
demand for TLDs, as they provide a presence and identity on the
Internet for those possessing them (see Froomkin , Weinburg ,
Froomkin and Lemley ).
In the s, the global political and economic significance of domain
name allocation led to efforts by policy makers, governments and the
private Internet community to attempt to create a governance system for
these lynchpin resources. As a result in , the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was formed. Since then ICANN
has played an important role in the management of TLDs and the still
evolving framework of global governance for the Internet.
The EU’s role in ICANN’s initial structural development was mar-
ginal. The popularisation of the Internet in the mid s led European
T  European regulatory state and internet community governance compared.
European Regulatory State Internet Community
Governance Form Public Private
Parameters of Behaviour Legislation (Regulations and
Directives)
Voluntary Codes of Conduct
Regulatory Style Command and Control Self Management
Enforcement Mechanism Public National and European
Regulatory Authority
Adjudication
Private Alternative Dispute
Resolution
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policymakers to consider its evolution more closely. Christopher
Wilkinson, an official in the European Commission’s DG Information
Society (DGIS) personally followed developments in America and was
concerned to ensure that any evolving governance model for the Internet
should be truly global in nature. The recommendation for the creation of
a dot eu TLD followed the European Commission’s initial involvement
in the discussions on creating ICANN. The Commission’s policy objec-
tive was overwhelmingly practical. It wished to take advantage of
business interest in the years of the dot com boom and to exploit the
limited choice within the generic TLD industry (dot com, dot net and dot
org). The EU intended to provide business interests with a European
trademark for operating in cyberspace by creating a European territory
in the global Internet market. The Regulation which the EU eventually
produced argued that dot eu would raise the profile of the Single
European Market and would act as an effective complement to existing
national TLDs (European Parliament and European Council of
Ministers, ). There was also a wider implication in the creation of dot
eu, namely, a Europeanised response to new global Internet governance
phenomena (Andersen ).
Despite the EU’s ambitions for an early launch of dot eu, there were
procedural obstacles that constrained any hope of swift progress. The
proposal for dot eu initially received a negative reaction from the ICANN
Board, being viewed as an initiative from a regional organisation
dominated by governmental interests, anathema to many in the
Corporation at the time. The EU’s astute response was to emphasise and
play to the fundamental beliefs and founding principles of ICANN in
order to overcome its scepticism and limit the ICANN Board’s room for
manoeuvre. In doing so, the EU showed considerable political skill.
ICANN was established, amongst other things, to operate as a private
entity for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole. The
European Commission therefore, consulted widely amongst these very
interests, through a collective grouping known as European Community
Panel of Participants in Internet Organisation and Management (EC-
POP). By securing the support of the European Internet community it
became very difficult for the ICANN Board not to accept dot eu, despite
any reservations about governmental interference.
At EU institutional level, its legal requirements determined dot eu’s
progress. Advocates of the swiftest possible implementation argued that
dot eu should be dealt with as a technical matter and launched as an EU
project. This would have taken a matter of months and represented the
best scenario for business and industry and the product champions of dot
eu in the Commission. However, after consultation with the Commis-
sion’s legal services division, it became clear that that this proposed
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method was not viable and that an appropriate legal process had to be
undertaken. The rationale here was that dot eu raised issues of public
policy and, therefore, a legal Community text was required to provide a
framework establishing the EU’s regulatory role and the dot eu Registry’s
responsibilities, management functions, and obligations. The decision
was thus taken that a Regulation was needed to provide a broad legal and
policy framework to define the responsibilities of the actors involved in
administering and managing the dot eu TLD.
A public consultation on the possible creation of a dot eu in February
 confirmed strong support for the proposal to create a new Internet
TLD for the EU. Although a European Commission working paper
(February ) considered an array of options in relation to the types of
model for regulating dot eu, the not-for-profit, cooperative (public–
private hybrid) model, with the EU as ultimate controllee was seen as the
most appropriate for meeting the requirements of industry consensus,
neutral administration, protection from anti-competitive behaviour and
the respect for applicable laws. There was agreement that any framework
for dot eu, to be acceptable and legitimate, would have to ‘ fit’ with the
wider legal and institutional requirements of the EU and incorporate
values and traditions with which the EU was at ease (Commission
Working Paper : ).
The report produced by the Commission (July ) reflected similar
conclusions, but also the desire for consultation with relevant stake-
holders to define a suitable structure for the operationalisation of dot eu
(www.ec-pop.org/prop/:). The deliberations that followed, con-
ducted in an interim steering group (ISG) created under the auspices of
EC-POP and containing European Commission officials recognised that
in putting forth a framework for governing dot eu the Registry model
should reflect the basis of best practice, and the commercial objectives of
a Registry operating in an international electronic commerce environ-
ment. However, the group also argued that dot eu had institutional and
territorial implications for the EU which would necessitate a policy role
for both the European Commission and the Internet community. Both
EU Member States and the Commission were in favour of a governance
model that included an ‘ effective forum and mechanism for public policy
oversight on the operations of the dot EU Registry’ (www.ec-pop.org/
prop/:).
By incorporating its own form of regulatory tradition within the
governance framework for dot eu, the EU sought to reinforce its
self-regulatory style through global protocol established within ICANN’s
Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). The GAC considered that
TLD Registries were ultimately subject to the jurisdiction of the relevant
public authority or government and the EU, in this instance, was
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perceived to be the competent authority for the dot eu TLD. For its part,
the EU was aware of the need to limit intervention to a minimum, given
the highly decentralised structure of the Internet and the private statute
of ICANN. Despite this, however, it did reserve the right to exercise
ultimate oversight and supervision of the dot eu domain (Commission
Working Paper : ).
The framework outlined in the dot eu Regulation (European Parlia-
ment and Council ) eventually agreed by Member States provided a
hands-on role for the Commission in the formative stages of its
development, with a primary facilitative role for the Telecommunications
Committee initially, and its successor Communications Committee.
Although the organisation, administration and management of dot eu
would be delegated to a Registry, indicating an element of self-regulation,
contractual obligations and conditions would limit such self-management
under a time-limited and renewable agreement. In addition, the inclusion
of the PPR within the policy framework would provide the Commission
with the opportunity to protect EU interests and ensure that the
Registry’s actions were compliant with established public policy and legal
norms. The dot eu Regulation framing the initiative ensured that the
shadow of hierarchy loomed large over dot eu by stipulating clearly that
‘ The Community shall retain all rights relating to the dot eu TLD
including, in particular, intellectual property rights and other rights to
Registry databases required to ensure the implementation of [the]
Regulation and the right to re-designate the Registry’ (European
Parliament and Council ).
The European Commission launched a Call for Expressions of Interest
in becoming the Registry in August . The European Registry for
Internet Domains (Eurid) consortium, a collaboration between the
Belgian, Italian and Swedish country code TLD registries, was chosen on
the  May  to run the dot eu TLD. After considerable delay, the
public policy rules to govern dot eu were agreed in April . Eurid
concluded a ‘ Service Concession Contract’ with the Commission (
October ) to operate the dot eu Registry and at the global level
negotiated with ICANN to have dot eu put ‘ in the root’ (March ). It
also appointed the Czech Arbitration Court to provide ADR for dot eu
disputes and Price-Waterhouse-Coopers as a dot eu sunrise validation
agent (see http://www.eurid.eu/en/euDomainNames/timetableLaunch).
The trans-European regulatory network for dot EU
The emergence of the dot eu TLD illustrates how the EU was able to
operate with considerable delicacy and astuteness in its discussions with
the global Internet community, in the shape of ICANN, as well as its own
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European communications business sector to secure agreement on this
unique internationalised TLD. The fact that the primary actors in the
process were the European Commission and private sector interests
ensured that the EU was able to lead on dot eu’s development, thereby
eliminating the potential for the kind of regulatory competition witnessed
in other parts of the communications sector, notably telecommuni-
cations, over the specific approaches to be adopted in areas such as
universal service and local loop unbundling (see Humphreys and
Simpson ). The result was the design of a partial post-regulatory state
system of self-regulation in the shadow of public hierarchy in which a
trans-European regulatory network characterised by dispersed agencifi-
cation is in the process of being established. Figure  provides an
overview of the shape of this trans-European regulatory network for dot
eu. Here, the bi-directional relationship between the European Commis-
sion and the dot EU registry, Eurid, is already exhibiting some evidence
of the tensions between public and private modes of governance.
The public dimension to the ‘ dispersed agencification’ of dot eu
governance centres on the role which the European Commission will
play in enforcing the series of PPR which form a crucial backdrop to the
F  Relationships in the Trans-European Regulatory Network for Dot EU
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functioning of dot eu and which mark out the key policy ‘ ground’ on
which the Commission-Eurid relationship is developing. The PPR
provide detailed guidance to Eurid regarding how it should carry out its
role as a private, not-for-profit registry for the dot eu TLD. In the early
formative stages of the PPR, the European Commission and the Member
States determined their substance through discussion in the aforemen-
tioned Communications Committee, which excluded any Eurid repre-
sentatives despite the latter having been selected by that stage as the dot
eu registry (authors’ interview, ). This led to concerns about
protracted EU proceduralism and over-regulation (authors’ interview,
), highlighting cultural differences between the European regulatory
state and the Internet community.
In its bid to become the dot eu registry, Eurid had proposed a liberal
regulatory model based on classic Internet industry self-regulation,
characterised by voluntary codes of conduct and a representative panel of
stakeholders within the Registry to monitor its development. However,
the finalised PPRs were much more interventionist than Eurid envisaged,
despite it having eventually become involved in deliberations subsequent
to signing a contract with the Commission. The main reason was the
level of formal legal detail required by the Commission’s legal services
division (authors’ interview, ) reflective of European regulatory state
practices.
For example, the sunrise period for dot eu was ‘ EU-ised’ by an
unconventional prioritisation, by Internet community standards, of
public bodies’ rights to register their domain names under dot eu. A
second classic example of EU proceduralism and formality concerned
registration of names in the official languages of the EU. Eurid’s original
proposal had stipulated a voluntary system to provide registration
services in all community languages, to be determined by available
resources and market demand once dot eu was operationalised. How-
ever, the Commission argued that registration had to be provided in all
EU languages per se, the perils of which were illustrated by the Maltese
language example. Registration services for dot eu had to be made
available in Maltese, even though it was not possible to register a domain
name in this language under its own national country code domain name
system, something viewed by one source as ‘ political correctness gone
mad’ (authors’ interview, ).
Further indication of the influence of the European regulatory state on
dot eu governance is to be found in the detailed relationships and
procedures specified by the Commission to be developed by Eurid in
relation to the day to day process of registering names under dot eu.
Here, Eurid’s responsibilities for appointing and managing a series of
private profit making registrar companies were set out in almost arcane
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detail. For example, it was stated that a ‘ registrar who receives more than
one registration request for the same name shall forward those requests
to the Registry in chronological order in which they are received’
(European Commission : article ). It was also stipulated that
registrars must require applicants to submit contact details of a person
responsible for the technical management of the domain name to be
registered. This is arguably something that any good private professional
organisation would have done as a matter of course.
Similar interventionist tendencies are evident in the post-regulatory
state elements of the dot eu governance system. Regarding codes of
conduct for registrars, whilst Eurid was given responsibility for their
creation, at the behest of its legal services division, the European
Commission is required to ensure that the codes comply with the PPR
(authors’ interview, ). The double oversight appears contradictory to
the idea of this classic element of self-regulation. On Alternative Dispute
Resolution procedures, the PPR, whilst reflecting compliance with, and
adaptation of, norms created at the global organisational level in ICANN
and WIPO, also add procedural detail allowing the EU scope for
customisation to its own self-regulatory style. Illustrative of this are
specifications defining the circumstances in which ADR could take place.
This can occur either where a plaintiff alleges speculative or abusive
registration of a domain name or where it is alleged that a decision taken
by Eurid contravenes the PPR or the specifications of the EU Regulation
on the implementation of dot eu.
Although such detailed rule making and delegated proceduralism
across public and private ‘ agents’ in theory facilitates the development of
more accountable and transparent regulation, it is in diametric contrast
to the liberal practices of governing the Internet at global level in
organisations such as ICANN. In this respect, the EU proved adept at
customising the governance model for dot eu away from that initially
proposed by Eurid, which has ‘ gradually been dragged towards more
regulation’ (authors’ interview, ).
Nonetheless and by contrast, it is also important to emphasise that the
private dimension in the design of the dot eu trans-European regulatory
network vividly reflects key operational aspects of the kind of private
self-regulation that has come to be associated with the Internet commu-
nity and, more widely, with ideas of the post-regulatory state. In this,
Eurid’s role will also be vital, since it holds a range of responsibilities
which are germane both to self-regulatory forms of business practice in
the management of TLDs as well as the guardianship and promotion of
the dot eu system. The work which it delegates to validation agents, ADR
providers and registrants – evidence of private dispersed agencification
in our terms – will have to meet criteria established by ICANN’s
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Governmental Advisory Committee regarding the delegation and admin-
istration of country code TLDs, with dot eu regarded as a special case
(European Parliament and Council, annex , article ).
The culture of the Internet community shows up in Eurid’s
management. First, the eclectically composed management Board will
contain representatives from the Eurid consortium, European industry,
European Internet Service providers, the dot eu registrar companies, the
Internet technical community and the academic and research commu-
nity. Second, Eurid’s Policy Council will contain as many as 
representatives from across the European Internet community and must
be consulted by the Eurid Board regarding any decision taken regarding
registration policy. Finally, Eurid’s relationship with ICANN will be
significant as the former is likely to assume the role of a country code
TLD registry in this global forum, though it is difficult to predict its exact
form. Given the rather more hands on regulatory system which Eurid will
be intimately involved with in the domestic (that is EU) context, it may
find itself more closely attuned to ICANN’s culture and practices. If
so, this could have an impact on the way the governance of dot eu
evolves in the future, especially given the tensions between the public
and the private in the pivotal position which Eurid occupies in the
trans-European regulatory network for dot eu.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that the case of the dot eu TLD provides evidence
of the creation of public–private transnational governance in the
European Internet economy. The EU’s choice of governance system and
regulatory methods reflects a significant, though only partial, movement
towards post-regulatory state governance in which the practices of the
European regulatory state, on the one hand, and the Internet commu-
nity, on the other, sit together in what is potentially an uneasy
conjunction. Thus, the regulation of dot eu will take place across a hybrid
public–private trans-European regulatory network across with dispersed
agencification of the governance of dot eu.
The EU’s domestication of the developing modalities of Internet TLD
governance at the global level illustrates how it has become a major actor
in global communications policymaking. Elsewhere in the communi-
cations sector, a useful comparison can be made with its role in the
negotiation of the World Trade Organisation’s  Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications (ABT), where the EU was similarly successful in
securing its interests, though in a different way and for different reasons.
In the negotiations, the EU was able to ‘ upload’, that is ensure the
acceptance of, its preferences for trade liberalisation to such an extent
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that the ABT bore uncanny similarities to the EU’s own telecommuni-
cations liberalising package developed over the previous decade (see
Young ).
The dual-phase sunrise period for dot eu was launched on  December
 and is due to run to the  April , when registration will then be
opened up to the general public on a first-come first-serve basis. Whether
or not this experimental form of governance for the EU proves successful
once fully operational and embedded will depend on the extent to which
self-regulation can be married with EU public policy interventionism.
Whilst the Internet has by now become an established part of European
economy and society (see Rose ), the private interest government
advocated by the Internet community and underpinned by self-
regulation has yet to prove its superiority to other more public forms of
governance. Certainly self-regulation has the potential to deliver a range
of benefits in terms of financial cost and time saved by reducing
bureaucracy. The fact that it involves regulatees becoming their own
regulators provides the opportunity for market players to gain an
awareness of the broader context and consequences of their actions
beyond profit. It is arguably the case that market participants are best
placed to know precisely the kind of regulatory measures which should be
deployed in their market, and which should be avoided.
However, the opportunities for firms to act as free-riders in a market
governed by pure self-regulation and the fact that market players are
unlikely to consider the broad, longer term interests of consumers and
users in their market means that governments have tended to assume that
backstop interventionary powers are essential to stimulate optimal
self-regulatory behaviour.
The trans-European regulatory network for dot eu can be seen as the
structural embodiment of an attempt to resolve the contradictions of
self-regulation. EU member states have taken the decision to share
governance responsibility between public and private agents. Tensions
have arisen from the different cultural outlook and practices of both the
European Commission and Eurid when they have approached regulatory
tasks. However, the public–private design of dot eu could also prove to
be a highly skilful political construct in practice. On the one hand, Eurid
may be well placed to develop the high levels of professionialism, mutual
trust, and cooperation necessary to make dot eu in practice appealing to
Internet users. On the other, the European Commission, may be able to
resolve value conflicts and interest-balancing dilemmas that Eurid, with
its more technical remit, is arguably ill-equipped to deal with.
More broadly, core lessons emerge about why transnational private
governance can occur in the European political economy. First, despite
other parts of the communications sector having developed historically in
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Europe within strong state led traditions, the Internet originated in
America outside mainstream communications, albeit with government
funding. Its novelty and its internationality made it amenable to
transnational private governance. Second, after many years of technical
development and usage by the computer science and academic commu-
nities, the Internet became commercialised and popularised at a time
when the discourse of neo-liberal globalisation was paramount, undoubt-
edly reinforced by its origins in the American political economy (see
Schiller ). Finally, since the EU can resist and ‘ domesticate’
transnational private governance agendas developed at the global level,
this raises the question of the extent to which this activity is developing
in other sectors of the international political economy.
NOTES
. Research for this paper was undertaken as part of the UK ESRC European Regulation of Internet
Commerce project (Grant number RES-––).
. Agents will be temporary members of the network during a four month phased registration period.
. Public organisations are also likely to register a name under dot eu.
. However, the EU Treaties limit Member States’ ability to additional bodies with formal legal
powers to undertake regulation.
. Ultimate control of the DNS is held at a pyramidal pinnacle by a series of  ‘ server’
computers – which have been referred to as the ‘ root’ (Mueller ).
. See http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/DotEU/WorkDocEN.html and http://
europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/DotEU/WorkDocEN.html
. See http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/DotEUMay/EN.html and http://
europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/DotEUMay/EN.html
. One might argue that this fits well with the notion that industry’s self-image of self-regulation in
Europe has a corporatist twist, in that the public sector is accepted as a participant in the
self-regulatory process, in a catalytic or facilitative role.
. The Belgian partner in Eurid is DNS BE; the Italian partner IIT-CNR and the Swedish partner
NIC-SE. Eurid is in the process of setting up offices in those countries. Eurid headquarters are
located in Brussels. See http://www.eurid.eu/en/about
. For progress on this see http://www.eurid.eu/en/euDomainNames/codeOfConduct.html
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